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Abstract 
Despite the radical shifts that that continue to characterise both Maghreb and Europe, the rhetoric 
surrounding the EU’s ‘Neighbourhood’ policies have proven largely resilient to change. This 
chapter grapples with this policy persistence through the perspective of ‘imperial identity 
practices’, and argues that short of being an Empire in the traditional sense, an implicit imperial 
identity motivates EU policies. This can be illustrated by scrutinizing the Union’s approach to 
Maghreb countries across two key policy areas, Energy and Trade. Conceptualising these 
policies as constitutive practices provides analyses of the implicit power, rationality, and 
discourses that practices reify. Imperial identity practices capture this well: in a changing world, 
where what lays outside the boundaries of empire pose both opportunities and threats, there is 
significant ontological security in sticking to the same practice of expanding its reach through 
rule ‘convergence’. 
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The burgeoning field of Euro-Mediterranean studies has focused on the reaction of the European 
Union to the Arab Uprisings, and the democratisation processes that are hoped to follow from 
them (e.g. Balfour, 2012; Dennison, 2013; Tömmel, 2013). Attention has specifically focused on 
the so-called renewed European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and whether there is a shift 
towards more conditionality and ‘more for more’ approaches to the transitioning region, or 
whether there is “nothing new at all” (Schumacher, 2011: 4). This chapter contributes to this 
literature by noting that despite the radical shifts that have taken place in the region, the rhetoric 
surrounding EU’s policies have actually changed very little. Subsequently, what we observe are 
durable, constitutive discursive structures, which persist regardless of even the most dramatic 
human suffering at the EU’s doorstep: indeed, the Syrian and Libyan war, the humanitarian 
catastrophes they produce, drowning people in the Mediterranean, violent crackdown of 
opposition in Egypt and Turkey, and international disengagement with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict make up a region that looks dramatically different from the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ 
of five years ago. Nevertheless, the EU’s focus on normative, rule-based change as the pinnacle 
of its ‘Neighbourhood’ policy continues unabated. This chapter grapples with this persistence 
through the perspective of ‘imperial identity practices’.  
It argues that, short of being an Empire in the traditional sense, an implicit imperial 
identity motivates EU policies, and this can best be seen by scrutinising the Union’s approach to 
Maghreb countries across two key policy areas: energy and trade. These two fields indicate that 
EU policies in the framework of the regional Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the 
bilateral ENP are based on extending the body of law governing the European Community (the 
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acquis communautaire), often at the expense of other options that would better facilitate trade 
and energy flows between the two shores of the Mediterranean. These policies are codifications 
of the EU’s modus operandi, which is based on a continuous extension of EU norms, rules, 
practices and interests – and is pursued even vis-à-vis states with no membership prospects.  
This chapter connects with debates on the unprecedented processes of rule transfer taking 
place between the EU and third parties. This has been described in terms of ‘Europeanization’, 
i.e. the process of constructing, diffusing and implementing formal and informal norms, which 
are first defined within the EU and then incorporated in domestic discourse, identity and political 
structures (Radaelli, 2003). The literature on ‘external governance’, i.e. the transfer of EU rules 
and policies to third countries, often at a level below the threshold of membership (Lavenex, 
2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009), observes that the EU is in fact engaged in 
Europeanization processes as a part of its foreign policy. This body of research has illustrated the 
way in which the EU exports its laws and regulations to the Neighbourhood, but also how these 
countries contest and negotiate aspects of European norms, both through formal negotiations and 
adaptation, and above all through varying application of formally adopted norms (Freyburg et al., 
2009; Gänzle, 2009; Youngs, 2009a). Here, theories of Europeanization are applied to the ENP 
framework, and studied with the aim of evaluating the effect of EU influence on formal rule 
adoption. But the literature has two primary limits: firstly, it often fails to look at the effects of 
transposed EU norms in the local context, and secondly it often overlooks the motivations behind 
seeking Europeanization outside the realm of formal representation. The optic of ‘imperial 
identity practices’ addresses these limitations, and provides a framework for analysing 
underlying power relations in the context of durable policies.  
The perspective builds on the literature on EU as Empire, inasmuch as it captures the 
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political nature of Europeanization processes. Zielonka (2006) describes the EU as a neo-
medieval Empire, characterised by its fuzzy borders and networked governance model, but also 
by its cultivation of peripheral borderlands into which the empire gradually extends. It is 
engaged in the construction of a ‘ring of friends’ around its centre, which creates marches or 
fluid buffer zones along the frontier of its empire (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008; Del Sarto and 
Schumacher, 2005). Subsequently, the ENP might be seen as an attempt to transform the external 
EU borders from areas of demarcation and division to areas of exchange and interaction (Comelli 
et al., 2007), while the general approach to the regions adjacent to Europe can be described as 
creating interconnected ‘borderlands’ that serve as buffer zones to the EU (Del Sarto, 2009).  
Yet, while the ‘EU as Empire’ debate is fruitful in understanding the political nature of 
regulatory expansion, it does not connect specific practices in EU-Neighbourhood relations with 
constitutive ideas of the Union, i.e. the identity properties germane to the nature of the EU. It 
tends to focus on the question of whether the EU actually is an empire or not, and provides 
prefixes that would justify various labels (neo-medieval, post-modern, regulatory, non-imperial 
and in denial). In contrast, when this chapter explores the approach taken by the EU to establish 
a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community, and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs) with selected Maghreb states as practices, it invites an analysis of the 
implicit power, rationality, and discourses that specific and habitual practices reify. The 
assumption is that EU’s activities vis-à-vis its Southern Neighbourhood are practices that 
demonstrate both the ambitions and the identity of the Union, and not only action: while action is 
behaviour with meaning, and is a specific behaviour located in time, a practice is, according to 
Adler and Pouliot, “socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or 
less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and 
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discourse in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 6). The chapter seeks not only 
to describe the processes of external governance taking place in bilateral relationships, but also 
to explain what motivates this relationship. Inspired by Hansen (2011), ‘practices of imperial 
identity’ exposes the underlying ‘background knowledge’ that justify specific practices in EU 
foreign policy making towards the Maghreb region, while preventing the possibility of other 
types of practices. This approach is novel in that it combines a study of practices with 
explanations grounded in constitutive frameworks. It thereby focuses its attention on showing 
that many of the activities that comprise the EU-Neighbourhood relationship are driven by a 
default adherence to regulatory expansion – even where the chances of success are rather 
chimeric.  
 The chapter first discusses recent work that studies the EU as a form of empire, and 
offers a framework for understanding ‘practices of an imperial identity’. The practices observed 
should be understood as instances of discourses and institutions governing EU external relations, 
which the chapter claims have ‘imperial’ inclinations, i.e. a core expanding its sphere of 
influence into its periphery through asymmetric relationships. The subsequent sections illustrate 
this argument by two case studies of the practice of promoting an Energy Community, on the one 
hand, and DCFTAs on the other.  
 
 
Conceptualising EU Foreign Policy as Practices of Imperial Identity 
 
The framework of ‘practices of imperial identity’ depicts the EU as an ‘informal empire’, 
whereby the mode of expansion results from economic forces and normative values. This stands 
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in contrast to ‘formal empire’, which connotes the annexation of overseas/external territory (cf. 
Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; see also Gravier, 2009 and Zielonka, 2006). These practices are 
external manifestations of the EU’s mode of governing ‘inwards’; whereas the early European 
project was intent on governing that which laid within its borders, including however overseas 
(colonial) territories, the Union has gradually developed the willingness, capacity and above all 
the habits of influencing the peripheries beyond its borders, leading to a common feature of 
empires: the EU simultaneously is an empire and has an empire (Gravier, 2014). Rather than 
describing the EU as an empire per se, this chapter connects specific EU foreign policy practices 
to a broader understanding of the construction of a certain EU identity. In turn, constitutive 
discourses permit some practices, and prevent others, thus locking in a consistent ‘actorness’ of 
the Union – where the EU promotes imperial discourses and accompanying practices, capacity 
for autonomous action is enhanced (see Niemann and Bretherton 2013 for a recent discussion on 
EU ‘actorness’).  
Building on this notion of the EU as an informal empire, which engages in imperial 
governance beyond its borders, three commonly agreed general practices of empires are useful to 
survey in order to understand the specific practices of everyday EU Neighbourhood politics (cf. 
Gravier, 2011): First, the asymmetry of relations between the core and the periphery, whereby 
the EU and the sovereign states in the Southern Neighbourhood are not engaged in an equal 
‘partnership’, but are characterised by a strong and imposing core and a weaker ‘partner 
country’. This is a truth with modifications: both thick (in principle) and thin (in practice) 
contestation can be discerned across the ENP countries (see Del Sarto and Tholens, 
forthcoming). Yet, as a system, it is designed to impose non-negotiable ‘core’ principles in a 
designated ‘periphery’, thereby establishing asymmetric relations at a formal level. The second 
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element is expansion of spheres of influence, whether by territorial expansion through 
enlargement, or through regulatory and network-based expansion as seen in the EMP and ENP 
frameworks. Again, contestatory practices abound, but that does not change the fact that the 
system is designed to reproduce expansion in a unidirectional modality. Finally, imperial 
governance is characterised by the core being connected to its peripheries in a ‘hub and spoke’ 
system, i.e. dealing with the individual country directly and bilaterally, largely preventing a 
region to region type negotiation situation which would strengthen peripheries vis-à-vis the core. 
Whereas there are clear European interests in dealing with MENA states on a bilateral level, it is 
also partly a necessity, given the divided nature of the MENA region. It is not entirely clear 
whether it is the MENA region itself or the nature of EU initiatives that may explain the lack of 
regional cohesion: EU initiatives such as the Barcelona process (1995), and the Union for the 
Mediterranean (2008) have sought to provide the region with regional umbrella platforms, yet 
have had little traction, and remains marginal to actual interaction practices in the EU-MENA 
relationship. The three elements identifying imperial practices are constitutive elements of a EU 
foreign policy identity, this article argues, and serve as overarching general practices against 
which specific EU policy action vis-à-vis the Southern Neighbourhood should be understood.  
Conceptualising the EU as an informal empire that engages in imperial governance 
practices beyond its borders solve some of the challenges in disassociating empires from 
imperialism, on the one hand, and hegemony, on the other. Others have written extensively on 
these differences from various perspectives (Hardt and Negri, 2001; Münkler, 2007), but in this 
chapter it is pertinent to clarify how these concepts differ in the case of Europe-Maghreb 
relations: first, imperialism connotes a type of aggressive imposition of order in domestic 
societies that we do not easily see the EU overtly engaging in, contrary to the US presence on the 
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ground in many hotspots. Second, hegemony intends supremacy within a group of formally 
equal actors (Münkler, 2007), and despite Diez’ argument that hegemony ought to substitute the 
Normative Power Europe label (2013), it is apparent that the EU is not in a hegemonic 
relationship towards many of the rich, energy-producing countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean, and does not possess the material capabilities to impose any imperial order in 
those countries.  
And yet the EU is still seen to craft its policies towards the MENA region on the basis of 
rule export, non-equal negotiation patterns, and insistence on an “all but institutions” approach. 
This amounts to a puzzling foreign policy practice. As this chapter argues, it is shaped by an 
imperial identity, which is proving durable and persistent exactly because it is based on 
constitutive beliefs rather than optimised solutions to a given foreign policy challenge. A non-
imperial identity would aim solely at the increase of its functional interests, and henceforth be 
less concerned with exporting internal rules – much similar to value-free foreign policy as 
promoted by neorealist perspectives in International Relations. But the EU, despite profound 
changes both to the Maghreb region and to the EU itself, continues to make rule export the 
pinnacle of its foreign policy, indicating the significance of understanding foreign policy as more 
than ‘utility maximising’ behaviour.  
Key to the practice of foreign policy based on rule convergence is the ‘background 
knowledge’ of the EU as an imperial actor, which gradually extends into its periphery in a 
modality of rule expansion. The successful ‘conquest’ of Central and Eastern Europe provided 
the rationality behind the rule convergence approach, and the specific EU trade and energy 
policies we now see in place – or out of place – embody, enact and reify the implicit knowledge 
that rule convergence is intrinsic to the EU’s being in the world. EU Delegations in Maghreb 
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countries, as well as Maghreb actors, engage with these policy discourses by implicit reference to 
what they already know, i.e. that this is the ‘identity’ of the EU, and hence cannot be changed to 
any significant extent.  
A practice-based approach assumes that specific practices are patterned and habitual; 
socially recognised as competent; and weave together the discursive and material worlds (Adler 
and Pouliot, 2011a). The world is presented in specific ways through practices, and gives way to 
manifestations of how things are. Practices seeking to establish an Energy Community and 
DCFTAs are crucial in connecting the broader discourses of Euro-Mediterranean integration 
with the material world, a process which is primarily discursive, while supported by fragments of 
(EU-financed) institutions. Euro-Mediterranean integration emerged in the context of the 1990s 
optimism, and has produced an impressive number of formal agreements and cooperation 
activities.2 Certainly, the two shores of the Mediterranean have moved closer across diverse 
policy fields. But in many of these fields – certainly in Energy and also to some extent in Trade – 
the actual integration is rather minimal. The EU might be a more significant actor than before in 
this region, but the breakdown of physical and economic borders is still a very slow process. This 
observation highlights why practices manifesting the discourse of integration are so important: 
without a persistent pressure towards the establishment of an EU model of integration in the 
Southern Neighbourhood, the discursive world of an integrated Euro-Mediterranean area 
characterised by “prosperity, stability and security” (European Commission, 2011a: 14) will 
evaporate. Trade and Energy are very different sectors, as the EU has sole competence in 
negotiating trade agreements, while energy cooperation runs at a primarily bilateral and private 
level. We should then expect that the EU would formulate different policies in the Energy 
                                                            
2 See BORDERLANDS project website for data and maps on EU-MENA integration from 1995 until today, 
available here: http://borderlands-project.eu/home.aspx/  
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domain, but as we shall see, it does not. Rule convergence continues to constitute the prime 
discourse, arguably because the EU is seen as competent for this purpose – by its own cadre in 
Brussels, by the EU member states, and by the Maghreb countries. Rule-based foreign policy is 
socially recognised as ‘the EU way’. 
Within the discipline of International Relations, a focus on practices “transcends the 
dichotomy between political practices, as representations of the material balance of resources, 
and ideas” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 3). Identity, moreover, is the intersubjective understanding 
of who an actor is, and upon which social structure of norms and ideas actors base their 
preference and formulate their interests: identities constrain actors’ behaviour, but also constitute 
their world-views and preferences (Sjursen, 2002; Wendt, 1999). Identity conceptualised as 
constitutive practices is thus able to explain long-term trends in policy making; the range of 
options available to EU policy makers; and the way specific practices contribute to reify a given 
identity – or a set of identities. This echoes Mitzen’s work on how habits and routines anchor 
identity in a way that makes actors attached to and invested in those routines, due to the need for 
ontological security and the interest in ensuring the stability of their identity as a particular kind 
of actor (Mitzen, 2006: 271–272). The EU has an interest in furthering its identity, but is also 
bound by it in inexplicit ways. This is not limited to the debate on the EU as a Civilian or 
Normative Power (Manners, 2002), which is focused on depicting the EU’s sui generis 
characteristics as different from those of other, traditional, interest-seeking actors.3 Practices of 
an imperial identity, instead, refer to a modality of foreign policy that enacts and reifies aspects 
associated with the EU’s identity as an expanding actor on the world’s stage. Constructed over 
years of horizontal and vertical extension, enlargement and, eventually, Neighbourhood 
                                                            
3 For convincing critiques see Hyde-Price (2006) and Pace (2007), as well as Del Sarto (2013) 
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Europeanization, the habit of expansion constitutes a patterned and competent performance that 
must be held as evidence of a shared understanding of what the EU is.  
The next section traces the practices of creating a DCFTAs and Energy Community with 
the Southern Mediterranean ‘partner countries’ in more detail.  
 
 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements  
 
Formalised trade cooperation with MENA countries goes back to the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (1973-1992), which covered trade preferences and financial protocols through bilateral 
agreements. In the early 1990s, a renewed Mediterranean policy extended to also cover issues of 
human rights, environment and democracy promotion (El-Agraa, 2011: 407). In 1995, the 
Barcelona process ignited new forms of cooperation, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
sought, among other goals, to establish free trade between the EU and the partner countries, and 
between the partners themselves. The ambition was to create a Euro-Mediterranean FTA by 2010 
(Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). However, intra-regional MENA trade in general 
remains one of the lowest in the world (Rouis and Tabor, 2013). After WTO negotiations stalled 
in the mid-2000s, the EU began redirecting its approach to Neighbouring countries by launching 
bilateral FTAs, spelled out in the 2006 Global Europe: Competing in the World communication 
(European Commission, 2006). Avoiding the difficult multilateral negotiations characterising 
WTO rounds, the EU saw bilateral FTAs as a way of including regulatory and ‘tough’ issues in 
their negotiations with third countries, and as such, FTAs are a subway for the EU to implement 
its deep trade agenda (Liargovas, 2013: 2).  
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 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) is a specific type of Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) that was first launched in 2007, but which has seen a revival in the 
MENA region after the 2011 Arab Uprisings. In the EEAS and European Commission’s 
communication A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of the Neighbourhood 
Policy, of 25 May 2011, the DCFTA is presented as “a free trade agreement covering a wide 
array of trade-related issues (“comprehensive”) and aiming at eliminating ‘behind the border’ 
obstacles to trade through processes of regulatory approximation, thus partially 
opening/extending the EU internal market to the other party” (EEAS and European Commission, 
2011: 14). Moreover, “beyond the mere elimination of import duties, these agreements should 
foster, in a progressive manner, closer integration between the economies of our Southern 
Mediterranean partners and the EU single market and would include actions such as regulatory 
convergence” (EEAS and European Commission, 2011: 9). DCFTAs are thus the latest attempts 
at liberalising markets and exporting the acquis communautaire. Negotiations have been opened 
with Morocco (2013) and Tunisia (2016). Yet they have proven difficult. For instance, 
negotiations with Morocco were suspended by Rabat in 2016 after the European Court of Justice 
invalidated a farm trade agreement between the EU and Morocco which it claimed unlawfully 
included the disputed Western Sahara territory. 
 DCFTA negotiations take place in the framework of the ENP, which is based on a 
principle of differentiation (rather than the strict application of the Copenhagen criteria), as was 
the case in the enlargement process with Eastern Europe. Indeed, differentiation has been 
highlighted as a fundamental principle of the ENP (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 17), and observed as 
the working modality of the EU towards the Southern Mediterranean (Barbé and Herranz-
Surrallés, 2012; Escribano, 2010). Differentiation indicates a ‘hub and spoke’ approach, in which 
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third countries are connected to the EU but not with one another. DCFTAs represent a possibility 
of scaling up the level of trade integration, albeit in an ‘all but institutions’ formula. It is a way of 
“moving from a process of negative integration (i.e., gradual dismantling of trade barriers) 
towards a process of positive integration (i.e., regulatory convergence in areas that have an 
impact on trade, in particular sanitary and phytosanitary rules, customs and border procedures, 
competition and public procurement)” (Montalbano and Nenci, 2012: 3). In offering the 
DCFTAs to ENP countries, the EU practice of exporting its own rules – even to countries 
without membership prospects – continues unabated.  
DCFTAs are a relatively new feature of EU external trade policy, and analyses are largely 
based on future economic projections and evaluations of intentions rather than actual 
agreements. In other words, we do not know what effects they might produce, but a number of 
critiques as to the purpose of such trade agreements have emerged. Some see a ‘capabilities-
expectation gap’ between ENP demands and rewards, and argue that the misfit between the 
demands of complying with the acquis without the prospects of membership renders the 
DCFTAs dependent on its ability to create increased trade flows. It is thus interesting to note that 
the same study finds that while the EU is currently the biggest trading partner for ENP countries, 
it is gradually loosing markets to BRIC countries, both in import and export terms (Artelaris et 
al., 2013: 28).  
In addition, even if most of Maghreb export goes to Europe, they are not considered 
major trading partners of the EU. This picture gives some indication that there is more at stake 
here than merely seeking to facilitate trade when endowing the DCFTAs with a strong rule 
convergence component. Other analysts see DCFTAs as a carrot and stick approach that 
reproduces the core-periphery spatial pattern of development, and further emphasises the ‘hub-
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and-spoke’ system of the ENP. The system, according to this view, thus reproduces the uneven 
trade patterns between the two regions, and connects the core to the periphery not through 
regional arrangements and not by creating income convergence, but through a type of integration 
that is primarily intended to bring neighbours gradually closer to the Single Market (Kallioras, 
2013). Others again point to the fact that the idea of deep and comprehensive FTAs was 
launched already in 2007, and as such is a repackaged concept. This is especially true in light of 
the agenda of negotiating liberalisation of trade in services, as well as initiating negotiations in 
the areas of investment, government procurement, and competition policy is particularly stressful 
for transition countries (Mohamadieh, 2012).  
Taken together, the EU’s latest trade overture in the Southern Neighbourhood is arguably 
not driven exclusively by economic interest. The EU does not have major trade interest in the 
region, and studies point to the increased relevance of the BRIC countries over European 
countries in future trade projections. There might be a deeper belief that restructuring Maghreb 
markets will be beneficial for European producers, but negotiators are not explicitly engaging 
with this idea.4 In the absence of membership prospects, and bearing the lack of any real trade 
benefits in mind, one might ask: Why would there be a major focus on ‘Neighbourhood 
Europeanization’ in the DCFTAs?  
DCFTA intends a process of positive integration based on regulatory convergence, as 
opposed to negative integration, which classic FTAs address through the dismantling of trade 
barriers. But convergence remains a fuzzy concept in EU policy: whereas a literal understanding 
of convergence indicates a process of gradually changing so as to become similar or develop 
something in common, convergence in EU external trade relations means that third parties adopt 
the relevant set of rules codified in the acquis communautaire of the European Union. Indeed, 
                                                            
4 Interview with senior official in DG Trade and negotiator of DCFTA with Morocco, Brussels April 2013 
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integration, in the area of trade, means aligning the legislation with the acquis, which means that 
products are treated as internal products. This would imply Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance (ACCA), which would align legislation but also harmonise the 
conformity process, for example in laboratories. Integration is thus more than ‘equivalents’, 
which is applied in case of the EU-US free trade agreement (the now stalled Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP), where it is clear that agreements will be based on 
comparable equal standards in the two countries, but will not be seeking regulatory convergence.  
Clearly, the EU will not adopt US legislation, and the US will not adopt EU legislation. 
Instead, they will come to an agreement over which rules to consider as equivalent in the two 
countries’ legislation. And this is the difference between a DCFTA and an FTA: while an FTA, 
and also the latest versions of the FTAs, such as with Korea and the ones under negotiation with 
Japan and the US, seeks to be based on equivalence in standards and regulations, DCFTA means 
trade integration based on the Community acquis.5 In other words, the DCFTAs seek to align 
regulations of the Maghreb countries with EU regulations, not converge legislation in the literal 
sense, or find negotiated equivalents. Maghreb states generally see the EU’s insistence on rule 
convergence, and the apparatus of aid and training that comes with it, simultaneously as neo-
colonialism and as providing opportunities: we know for example that in notoriously 
protectionist Algeria (Serres, 2016) and Egypt (Roccu, 2015) elites successfully exploited 
systems of EU regulatory reform and ‘capacity building’ to their advantage, while the official 
discourse of ‘interference’ remained. Maghreb elites are co-opted by EU foreign policy while 
official domestic discourse might be more inclined to emphasise their strength and 
independence.  
                                                            
5 Interview with senior official in DG Trade and negotiator of DCFTA with Morocco, Brussels April 2013 
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“One could say that it is not deep trade per se that the EU has been seeking in its 
(European) neighbourhood; it has rather been seeking its own expansion, in the form of the 
export of the EU acquis communautaire, with access to its Single Market as the key attraction 
point for its partners” (Dreyer, 2012: 22). And indeed, seeking its own expansion appears to be 
the modus operandi of EU trade policy in its ‘periphery’: the priorities are clearly different from 
bilateral negotiations with major trade partners such as the US, and the way in which the EU 
approaches the neighbourhood with a predefined set of rules and a liberal trade agenda that may 
or may not be beneficial to the conditions in the given country, appears to be primarily aimed at 
expansion for the sake of expansion. In leading negotiations towards a DCFTA with Morocco, 
for example, it is clear that the EU intends not only, or even primarily, to produce an outcome 
(an agreement), but to send signals to the Neighbourhood as to what it means to be a favoured 
partner of Brussels. This practice is coupled with what is often called a ‘carrot and stick 
approach’, using positive incentives and negative conditionality to induce ‘change’. It is also an 
instance of enlargement logics that continue to characterise external Neighbourhood relations, 
and which so perfectly captures the essence of the Union’s imperial governance modality. The 
DCFTAs, moreover, invoke the pattern of enlargement, in which candidate countries adopt EU 
rules in sectorial policy areas, in return for gradual inclusion in the Community. Reproducing 
this practice gives a regularised or habitual meaning to the imperial paradigm, deepening the 
Union’s ontological security.  
DCFTAs can be described as a ‘practice of imperial identity’: the EU engages in 
Europeanization towards external parties not primarily because it sees it as in its immediate 
interest, but because it is a constitutive feature reifying its identity as an actor that expands and 
governs outward. The practice of extending its own rules and braking down economic borders 
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through non-negotiable adherence to the acquis is part and parcel of EU being in the world, and 
connects its preferences and beliefs with the discourses of a joint partnership based on liberal 
conceptions of peace and prosperity.  
 
 
A EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community 
 
Energy reappeared on the agenda of EU policy makers during the early 2000s, after decades in 
the shadow of European affairs. Increased consumption and decreased production of energy on 
the European continent has created a situation whereby Europe’s energy independence dropped 
from 66% in 2000 to 56% in 2010, and continues to drop (Abdallah et al., 2013). Awareness of 
the vulnerability of European energy markets increased after the 2006 Gasprom crisis, in which 
gas was withheld from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, and subsequent EU communications 
addressed the need for Europeanization of energy policy as well as for a rapid completion of the 
internal market in energy across Europe (Youngs, 2009b). The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 included 
for the first time a chapter on energy, and thus transferred competencies in the field of energy 
from the Member States to the European Community, evident in the establishment of a 
Directorate General for Energy – DG ENER (Braun, 2011). While member states still retain 
sovereignty over the security of supply and the composition of their energy mix, managing the 
nascent internal market in energy, as well as the somewhat vague principle of energy solidarity, 
is now under the competencies of the EU.  
In parallel to completing the internal market in energy, the EU’s external energy relations 
have accelerated over the last decade. Recognising the international dimension of the energy 
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market, as well as the need for a coherent approach to energy import, the EU has increasingly 
taken charge of external energy affairs, and issued in 2011 the Communication EU Energy 
Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders, in which the EU’s interest in “secure, 
sustainable and competitive” energy was spelled out (European Commission, 2011b). The 
European approach to the Southern Mediterranean in the field of energy is often associated with 
a need for Energy Security (Andoura, 2013), with liberalisation through unbundling of the 
ownership structures in domestic markets (Eikeland, 2011), and a focus on the creation of 
renewable energy (Mason, 2009). This goal is to be sought in parallel with private sector 
infrastructure projects, such as gas and oil pipelines and electricity interconnectors.  
In their Joint Communication on A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity of 
8 March 2011, the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy announced their commitment to “establish[ing] a EU-South Mediterranean 
Energy Community” (European Commission, 2011a: 9). Recognising the strategic relevance of 
supplies from and transit through the Mediterranean region, and referring to the possibility of 
extending the Energy Community Treaty currently in place with Eastern and South-Eastern 
neighbours, the document states that “this community should cover relevant parts of the EU’s 
energy legislation with a view to promoting a real and reliable convergence of South 
Mediterranean partners’ energy policies with EU policy” (European Commission, 2011a: 10). 
Also in the December 2013 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) Ministerial Meeting on Energy, 
which was supposed to confirm support to Euro-Med energy initiatives, a topic on the agenda 
was “Political Discussion on a Mediterranean Energy Community” (Union for the 
Mediterranean, 2013), confirming the continued existence of the idea in high level policy circles. 
After the unexpected failure of this 2013 UfM Ministerial Meeting on Energy to commit to the 
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Mediterranean Solar Plan, new and conspicuously similar initiatives emerged as UfM Energy 
Platforms: on Electricity Markets, on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, and Gas. 
Observers of EU external energy policy have noted that this approach is rooted in rule-based 
governance reform, and that the new energy partnerships with third countries represent a familiar 
EU-style approach of contractual agreements to attain adherence to rule-based behaviour on 
market, regulations, transport and safety (Youngs, 2009b: 44). It has also been noted that the 
convergence approach serves to hedge markets and geopolitics in an attempt to secure energy 
supplies from the Southern Mediterranean (Escribano, 2010). Moreover, while the EU does not 
speak with one voice in the field of energy, it does speak with one rule, and does attempt to 
engage in rule export, both through top-down convergence and bottom-up learning processes 
(Carafa, 2013).  
The policy of approaching energy integration as rule convergence has proven resilient, 
even if there is very little indication of a real integration of the energy systems across the 
Mediterranean: while there is a frenzy of activity in Euro-Mediterranean energy area compared 
to 10 years ago, there is little evidence that the Northern and Southern rim of the Mediterranean 
are actually harmonising rules and regionally integrating energy markets.6 Moreover, both the 
EMP and ENP frameworks have so far both largely failed to institutionalise Euro-Mediterranean 
energy integration (Darbouche, 2011). It is therefore somewhat surprising that the European 
Commission and the High Representative in the Communication of 8 March 2011 on Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity announced their commitment to “establish a EU-South Mediterranean 
Energy Community”, which “should cover relevant parts of the EU’s energy legislation with a 
view to promoting a real and reliable convergence of South Mediterranean partners’ energy 
                                                            
6 Confirmed through author interviews with DG Energy officials, Brussels 2013. As one official in the 
International Relations and Enlargement Unit working on the MENA region said: “We are still at point zero”. 
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policies with EU policy” (European Commission, 2011a: 9–10). The European Commission thus 
spelled out its policy ambition for the EU’s energy cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean 
based on the construction of an ‘Energy Community’. According to this and similar statements, 
an Energy Community should be based on regulatory convergence with the EU acquis 
communautaire, much in the same vein as the existing institution carrying the same name - the 
Energy Community (EnC) with South-East Europe.  
The EnC is a highly institutionalised and ‘top-down’ instrument aimed predominantly at 
pre-accession countries or countries with such ambitions. The Contracting Parties of the Treaty 
governing the EnC sign up to “the creation of a pre-accession mechanism with the 
implementation of the Community acquis in this field; the establishment of an effective 
regulatory framework; and the creation of an internal energy market between the countries in the 
region” (Council of the European Union and Contracting Parties, 2006). The fact that the same 
name is now applied to future energy cooperation in the Southern Mediterranean is hardly 
coincidental, and a source of tension already prior to any tangible deliverable.7 It is initially 
puzzling why the Commission insists on repackaging this enlargement concept in a region with 
very different types of relationships vis-à-vis the EU, especially when considering the lukewarm 
position of key stakeholders in the Maghreb region as well as among many private sector actors. 
It is well known that Algeria, as a net exporter of oil and gas to Europe, is deeply opposed to 
integration according to an EU style model based on market principles and rule convergence. 
Also in Euro-Med energy events, Algeria let that be made clear.8 Morocco and Tunisia, as net 
importers, are perhaps more inclined to discursively adhere to EU language on energy 
integration, yet also their energy markets are based on protectionism, subsidies, and state 
                                                            
7 Author interviews with private sector stakeholders to Euro-Mediterranean energy processes in Rome, Venice and 
Florence, 2013. 
8 Author participatory observation, Venice June 2013. 
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ownership over energy production and transmission processes – directly at odds with EU rules. 
Libya, moreover, is engulfed in an internal war that prevents any realistic participation in Euro-
Med energy events. With the persistent policy of energy integration based on an EU style energy 
community, the Commission appears to superimpose a political integration model onto a highly 
sensitive issue area in a politically fragmented region that might even hurt the incremental 
technical integration process that has slowly emerged over the past years, notably through the 
establishment of the Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG). So why does 
the EU keep on promoting rule-based integration, knowing it is not only unrealistic, but actually 
potentially detrimental to existing patterns of energy integration?  
The Energy Community might be a carefully selected, rational policy choice developed 
as a response to the challenge at hand, as seen for example in some of the bilateral strategic 
energy partnerships (currently in place with Egypt and Algeria), following different tracks of 
timing and priority of the processes. But bringing in the political level, i.e. formal state 
representation at the highest level, to an issue area like energy, and in a region as politically 
divided as the MENA region, might very well risk blocking emerging bottom-up cooperation 
initiatives and raise the stakes of cooperation to unacceptable levels. The competition between 
European institutions in the field of energy might also have shaped the Commission’s insistence 
on the policy. Youngs finds that the so-called ‘European approach’ of extending internal market 
networks is far from being a rationalised philosophy of energy security, but is rather the area in 
which the Commission enjoys energy-related competence and thus a policy space to manifest its 
agency (Youngs, 2009b: 40). In the case of the EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community 
individuals in the field clearly have the impression that this is an attempt by the Commission to 
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‘repackage’ an old concept, and thus regain some of the control over the cooperation processes.9  
A perspective that views the Energy Community as an automated policy making 
response, based on the EU’s previous experiences with enlargement in Eastern Europe, or its 
own experiences with developing the internal energy market, is however even more convincing. 
Indeed, it seems that despite the obvious lack of membership prospects, much of the repertoire of 
action towards the Southern Mediterranean is informed by similar logics to those that were 
applied to enlargement in the East (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Kelley 2006). The fact that 
the entire approach to the Southern Neighbourhood is mired in enlargement logics and 
repackaged concepts is indicative of the EU attempting to construct its relationship as one of 
centre versus periphery. This helps explain why the European Commission seems to be 
independently pushing for an approach to energy integration – with very little enthusiasm from 
its partners and stakeholders.  
 Automated policy responses, moreover, are patterned practices that manifest certain 
constitutive features of the actors engaged in them. The EU’s distinct approach to external 
energy policy in the Southern Neighbourhood is an example of the ‘practice of identity’, 
inasmuch as it is, perhaps primarily, aimed at enacting the ‘expanding community’ modality that 
defines the Union’s existence. Protagonists of the Energy Community repeatedly stress that it 
would not be based on the acquis, and that common rules will be agreed upon between the 
parties. Yet, there is inevitably an impression that the acquis is the basis for any EU-led energy 
integration in the region, and that it is indeed more important to export its rules than to foster real 
energy exchange (Tholens 2014).  
 The practice of structuring energy relations according to a rules-based form of integration 
links the material and discursive worlds in ways that ensure ontological security for the EU as an 
                                                            
9 Author observations in Euro-Mediterranean energy events in Venice, Florence and Rome during 2013. 
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expansive project. The material world of energy integration is often showed on maps during 
Euro-Mediterranean energy events: the interconnectedness of the Mediterranean, with its 
subterranean electricity cables and gas and oil pipelines and liquefied natural gas terminals are 
usually displayed during the opening speech of an event. As an example, at one event in 
Florence, Italy, in May 2013, a speaker from a European consortium presented the map of the 
Roman Empire, saying: “if they could do it, so can we”. The discursive world of an enlarged 
zone of integration, where European rules will prevail, is manifested in Euro-Mediterranean 
energy policies, events, and statements, which follows a set of unwritten and mutually agreed 
codes, i.e. ‘micro-practices’. A diversity of European actors and Maghreb state actors engage 
with these codes, which structure interaction between them but also make them part of a ritual 
process that is regularised and seen as competent. The EU’s financing of Euro-Mediterranean 
energy events, as well as UfM Platforms, MEDREG and a host of other initiatives over the last 
10-15 years, is a way of steering energy relations in a direction that is consistent with its imperial 
identity. Most European and North African actors know very well that an Energy Community 
based on European rules is entirely unrealistic. Yet, by establishing repeated practices of 
interaction that supports the expanding rule modality, the practices assume a key role in 
determining how power is defined in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.   
 
 
Conclusion: EU imperial identity practice in the Maghreb    
 
This chapter has analysed two specific overtures in the Southern Mediterranean through a focus 
on imperial practices that express and reify an EU identity based on expansion and extension. 
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Trade and Energy are dissimilar EU policy areas, but the policies of seeking an EU-South 
Mediterranean Energy Community and the launching of negotiations for DCFTAs have 
something fundamental in common: they are both aimed at exporting the acquis communautaire, 
and connecting North African countries to the EU core in a network of rules. Regardless of their 
bilateral or regional character, such unilateral ‘integration’ aims at rule convergence, which 
manifests the idea of an imperial Union that connects to its periphery through regulatory 
expansion.  
While observers of Euro-Mediterranean relations recognise that EU policy is essentially 
about a projection of the external governance of the EU (Cardwell, 2011: 237), this chapter has 
presented the optic of ‘imperial identity practices’ in order to refocus the attention on those 
habitual practices that the Union deploys in its relationship with the Neighbourhood. This is first 
of all a critique of the External Governance literature’s lack of attention to the political 
motivation behind the phenomenon of rule extension, and subsequently an attempt to take the 
EU as Empire literature to a constitutive level which re-politicises a legalist, technical and 
assumed unpolitical approach. The chapter has moved beyond a demonstration of whether the 
EU is or has an empire, and argues that that the EU repeatedly engages in practices that are 
consistent with imperial governance, i.e. they seek extension and expansion of EU rules and 
norms, even where this is the less optimal path to enhanced cooperation. Subsequently, EU 
Neighbourhood policies must be seen as made up of practices driven by, predominantly, a non-
explicit identity of an expanding power, which links with its ‘periphery’ through hub-and-spoke 
systems based on exporting the Union’s internal rules in a wholesale manner. These policies, and 
the host of micro-practices accompanying them, reify the discourses and background knowledge 
that pertain to the EU’s properties as an informal empire, in denial of its power projection but for 
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all intents and purposes fundamentally imperial in its dealing with Maghreb counties located in 
designed ‘Neighbourhoods’, or ‘borderlands’. It is remarkable how little has changed in the EU’s 
foreign policy towards this region, even as conditions both North and South of the Mediterranean 
have changed dramatically. Imperial identity practices capture this well: in a changing world, 
where what lays outside the boundaries of empire pose both opportunities and threats (a “ring of 
friends” or a “ring of fire”?), and where fragmentation threatens the cohesion of the Union, there 
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